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1. Motivation and background 
 
The rise of multinational enterprises (MNEs) from emerging markets is topical, important and 
poses a number of questions and challenges that require considerable attention in the future 
from academia as well as business management. Outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) 
from Asian emerging regions is not a new phenomenon, what is new, is the magnitude that 
this phenomenon has achieved over the past two decades. The recent takeovers of high-
profile companies in developed or developing countries by Asian emerging-market MNEs – 
such as Lenovo, Wanhua (China), Hindalco (India), etc. – as well as the greenfield or brownfield 
investments of emerging companies (such as Huawei, ZTE, Tata, etc.) show a new trend where 
new kind of firms become major players globally. According to the World Investment Report 
investments from emerging-markets reached a record level: based on UNCTAD data, 
developing Asia now invests abroad more than any other region (UNCTAD 2013).  
Today, the rise of emerging-market MNEs is driven by the Asian economy, mainly China and 
India, however, this process is broader, incorporates a growing number of developing 
economies and complemented by the growing share of emerging markets in world exports 
(Sauvant 2008, Nölke 2014). In addition, Asian emerging-market MNEs have become 
important players in several regions around the globe, ranging from the least developed 
countries of Africa through the developing markets in Latin America and Asia to the developed 
countries of the United States or the European Union, including Central and Eastern European 
(CEE) countries. 
This course material aims to provide background for the course titled "Emerging Asian 
Economies and multinational enterprises' (MNEs) Strategies". Topics of this course include the 
main theories of internationalization and foreign direct investment, the global patterns and 
recent trends of Chinese MNEs as well as home and host country determinants - i.e. push and 
pull factors - behind the international expansion strategy of Chinese companies. 
Besides its global focus, this course material maps out Chinese investment flows and types of 
involvement, and identifies the motivations of Chinese FDI in Europe, Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEE), with a focus on structural/macroeconomic and institutional as well as political 
pull factors. We will show that pull determinants of Chinese investments in CEE region differ 
 4 
from that of Western companies in terms of specific institutional and political factors that 
seem important for Chinese companies. This hypothesis echoes the call to combine 
macroeconomic and institutional factors for a better understanding of internationalization of 
companies (Dunning and Lundan 2008). 
After the introductory section, in the second chapter, we briefly summarize the existing 
theories of internationalization and foreign direct investment, including mainstream theories 
and new theoretical avenues. The third chapter presents the East Asian model of 
development, including economic processes as well as the analysis of institutional and political 
aspects. The fourth chapter describes the driving forces behind the international 
expansion strategies of Chinese MNEs by comparing the characteristics of Chinese, Japanese 
and South Korean foreign direct investment and by focusing on Chinese FDI globally as well as 
Chinese investments in Europe. Here, we also dedicate two subchapters to push and pull 
factors of Chinese outward FDI. The fifth chapter presents Chinese FDI in Central and Eastern 
Europe as a case study, including its changing patterns as well as major host-country 
determinants, using various statistics as well as company interviews2. The final chapter 
summarizes the main findings of the chapters mentioned above3.  
The Annex contains the syllabus of the course, suggested readings for each topic as well as 
graphs showing the outward foreign direct investment stock of selected emerging Asian 
countries.
                                                     
2 As the topic of Chinese FDI in European peripheries is new, started to draw academic attention only recently 
and the available literature is rather limited and based mostly on secondary sources, the author conducted 
several personal as well as online interviews with representatives of various Chinese companies in the ECE 
region. At major Chinese investors in the region the interviews were conducted anonymously. The author 
conducted semi-structured interviews at 5 companies, i.e. she drawn up a questionnaire and structured 
the interview based on some basic questions concerning the background of investment, motivations 
before the investment and the significance of the same factors later, a few years after the investment took 
place. Several further questions arose based on the original questions and responses to them, therefore 
the structure of each interviews were unique. Where interviews were not applicable, the author used 
other sources, such as business professionals, experts and academics from the neighbouring countries. 
3 The author will usually take into account foreign direct investment by mainland Chinese firms (where the 
ultimate parent company is Chinese),3 unless marked explicitly that due to data shortage or for other 
purposes they deviate from this definition. Since data in FDI recipient countries and Chinese data show 
significant differences, the two data sets will usually be compared to point out the potential source of 
discrepancies in order to get a more complex and nuanced view of the stock and flow of investments. For 
Chinese global outflows statistics from Chinese Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) and UNCTAD will be 
considered and compared. 
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2. Old versus new theories 
 
Although Asian foreign direct investment is not a new phenomenon but has attracted much 
attention since the mid-2000, because of (1) the unprecedented size of the phenomenon, (2) 
the fact that developing Asia accounts for more than a quarter of all outward FDI, (3) while 
this group of countries will be soon a net direct investor. The phenomenon itself is indeed 
existing since Japan, then later the Asian tigers (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and 
Taiwan) are all experienced similar upward trend in terms of inward as well as outward FDI. 
These countries can be considered as precursors of FDI from emerging countries today (such 
as BRICS - Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. Consequently, we can differentiate 
between three waves of FDI (Andreosso-O’Callaghan, 2016): 
1. FDI from emerging Europe, USA after World War II. 
2. FDI from Japan, then the Asian tigers after 1960's, 1970's, ... 
3. FDI from BRICS nowadays. 
The theoretical framework of FDI, as well as the concept of internationalization, has evolved 
a lot in the past century. To briefly summarize the mainstream theories of FDI, in the next 
subchapter we use the typology of Andreosso-O’Callaghan (2016), where different theories 
can be labelled as micro-, meso- or macro-economic levels. After these mainstream theories 
we also summarize the main findings of the Japanese School of FDI as well as those new 
theoretical attempts that try to explain FDI decisions of emerging MNEs. 
 
2.1 Mainstream theories 
 
Macro level theories include theories such as the capital market theory, the dynamic 
macroeconomic FDI theory or the exchange rate theory, economic geography theory, gravity 
as well as institutional approach and investment development path theory.  
Capital market theory is one of the oldest theories of FDI (1960s) which states that FDI is 
determined by interest rates. However, it has to be added that when this theory was 
formulated, the flow of FDI was quite limited and some parts of it were indeed determined by 
interest rate differences. According to the dynamic macroeconomic FDI theory, FDI is a long-
term function of TNC strategies, where the timing of the investment depends on the changes 
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in the macroeconomic environment. FDI theory based on exchange rates considers FDI as a 
tool of exchange rate risk reduction. The FDI theory based on economic geography explore 
the factors influencing the creation of international production clusters, where innovation is 
the major determinant of FDI. Gravity approach to FDI states that the closer two countries are 
- geographically, economically or culturally, ... - the higher will be the FDI flows between these 
countries. FDI theories based on institutional analysis explore the importance of the 
institutional framework on the FDI flows, where political stability is a key factor determining 
investments. 
According to the investment development path (IDP) theory, that was originally introduced by 
Dunning in 1981 and refined later by himself and others (Dunning 1986, 1988, 1993, 1997; 
Dunning and Narula 1996; Durán and Úbeda 2001, 2005), FDI develops through a path that 
expresses a dynamic and intertemporal relationship between an economy’s level of 
development, proxied by the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) or GDP per capita, and the 
country's net outward investment position, defined as the difference between outward direct 
investment stock and inward direct investment stock. 
In the framework of the investment-development path theory, Dunning also differentiated 
between five stages of development: 
• Stage 1. is characterized by low incoming FDI, but foreign companies are beginning to 
discover the advantages of the country. In this phase there are no outgoing FDI since 
there are no specific advantages owned by the domestic forms.  
• Stage 2. is characterized by growing incoming FDI due to the advantages of the country 
(such as low labour costs), while the standards of living are rising which is drawing even 
more foreign companies to the country. Outgoing FDI is still rather low in this phase.  
• In stage 3. incoming FDI is still strong, but their nature is changing due to rising wages. 
The outgoing FDI are taking off as domestic companies are getting stronger and 
develop their own competitive advantages.  
• In stage 4. strong outgoing FDI seeks advantages - for example low labour costs - 
abroad.  
• In stage 5. investment decisions are based mainly on the strategies of multinational 
companies and the flows of outgoing and incoming FDI come into an equilibrium. 
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At the meso-level we find Raymond Vernon's Product Life Cycle (PCM) model (Vernon, 1966), 
which conceptualizes the role of the diverse stages of the product cycle in boosting the level 
of economic development among regional trading partners. Vernon’s PCM theory was 
published at a time when there were the first traits of offshoring to developing (or lower wage) 
countries experienced by the US. Vernon differentiated between four stages of development 
of a new product:  
(1) domestic production - introduction phase,  
(2) export - growth phase,  
(3) export of capital - maturity phase and  
(4) foreign production - decline phase.  
While the product matures, the market expands, economies of scale set in that drives the 
prices down, justifying exports to other countries. When production costs - especially labour 
cost - became a major component of total costs, production is moving to lower labour-cost 
countries. According to this theory, companies decide to invest abroad considering beneficial 
ownership and transaction cost as well as local conditions. As a result, FDI can be seen mostly 
in the phases of maturity and decline.  
At the micro level (actually, at a mixed micro-macro level), Dunning's eclectic paradigm (also 
known as OLI model) became the mainstream theoretical framework explaining FDI (Dunning, 
1992, 1998). This paradigm states that firms will venture abroad when they possess firm-
specific advantages, i.e. ownership (O) and internalization (I) advantages, and when they can 
utilize location (L) advantages to benefit from the attractions these locations are endowed 
with. The OLI paradigm has changed a lot since it has first presented, ownership advantages, 
for example, have been divided into asset-based and transaction-based categories. "The 
asset-based ownership advantage is the exclusive or privileged possession of country- specific 
and firm-specific intangible and tangible assets, which gives the owner some proprietary 
advantage in the value-adding process of a particular product"... while "the transaction-based 
ownership advantages reflect the ability of a corporation to coordinate, by administrative fiat, 
the separate but complementary activities better than other corporations of different 
ownership and the market" (Cuervo, Pheng, 2003, p.82). The transaction-based ownership 
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advantage seems to be also very relevant for non-developed country multinational 
companies. 
Different types of investment motivations attract different types of FDI which Dunning (1992, 
Dunning-Lundan 2008) divided into four categories: market-seeking, resource-seeking, 
efficiency-seeking and strategic asset-seeking. The factors attracting market-seeking 
multinationals usually include market size, as reflected in GDP per capita and market growth 
(GDP growth). The main aim of a resource-seeking MNEs is to acquire particular types of 
resources that are not available at home (such as natural resources, raw materials) or are 
available at a lower cost compared to the domestic market (such as unskilled labour). 
Investments aimed at seeking improved efficiency are determined by low labour costs, tax 
incentives and so on: localization advantages “comprise geographical and climate conditions, 
resource endowments, factor prices, transportation costs, as well as the degree of openness 
of a country and the presence of a business environment appropriate to ensure to a foreign 
firm a profitable activity” (Resmini, 2005, p 3). Finally, the companies interested in acquiring 
foreign (strategic) assets might be motivated by a common culture and language, as well as 
trade costs (Blonigen and Piger, 2014; Hijzen et al., 2008). It should be emphasised that some 
FDI decisions may be based on a complex mix of factors (Resmini, 2005, 3; Blonigen and Piger, 
2014). Much of the extant research and theoretical discussion is based on FDI outflows from 
developed countries, for which market-seeking and efficiency-seeking FDI is most prominent 
(Buckley et al., 2007; Leitao and Faustino, 2010).  
 
2.2 The Japanese School of FDI 
 
Although it has often been left out from other theoretical overviews of FDI related books or 
papers, this paper plays special attention to the Japanese school of FDI, as it can be especially 
relevant in explaining Asian FDI. In addition, interesting links can be found between the 
Japanese school’s main ideas and the afforementioned PCM and/or IDP theories. 
In Asia, Japan was the first country that became outward investor. Its catching-up strategy can 
be traced back to the Meiji Restoration that allowed the country to became the „lead goose” 
in Asia. This process inspired the Japanese School of FDI. The flying geese paradigm (FGP) is a 
view of Japanese scholars upon the technological development in Southeast Asia 
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viewing Japan as a leading power. It was developed in the 1930s, but gained wider popularity 
in the 1960s after its author Kaname Akamatsu (1962) published his ideas in the Journal of 
Developing Economies. According to the theory, the „lead goose” Japan provides birth help to 
East Asian industrialisation through foreign direct investment. This catching-up experience 
emulated others and Japan's model was followed by South Korea and Taiwan, and later by 
China.  
The FGP model was reformulated by Kojima (2000) and Ozawa (2001). Terumoto Ozawa 
analysed the relationship of FDI, competitiveness and economic development based on the 
ideas of Michael Porter. Ozawa identified three main phases of development as he analysed 
the waves of FDI inflow and outflow from a country. These phases are factor driven, 
investment driven, innovation driven phases of development.  
• In the phase of economic growth the country is underdeveloped and targeted by 
foreign companies wanting to use its potential advantages (especially low labour 
costs). In this stage there is almost no outgoing FDI.  
• In the second phase the country attracts market-seeking inward FDI and intermediate 
goods industries from developed countries. In this phase, new FDI is drawn by the 
growing internal markets and by the growing standards of living. This development 
generates outward FDI to less-developed countries in labour-intensive and resource-
based industries.  
• In the third phase of economic growth the competitiveness of the country is based on 
innovation, while the incoming and outgoing FDI are motivated by market factors and 
technological factors. 
 
2.3 New theoretical avenues 
 
As mentioned above, although Asian FDI is not a new phenomenon, but what is different today 
is the scale of the phenomenon and the pace it has evolved since the early 2000s. In particular, 
since China launched its „go global” strategy (2000) and started to invest more and more 
globally. Nevertheless, traditional theories as well as economic factors seem to be insufficient 
in explaining FDI decisions of emerging (Asian) MNEs.  
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In the last decade international economics and business researchers acknowledged the 
importance of institutional factors in influencing the behaviour of MNEs (e.g., Tihanyi et al., 
2012). According to North, institutions are the “rules of the game” which are “the humanly 
devised constraints that shape human interactions” (North, 1990, p 3). Institutions serve to 
reduce uncertainties related with transactions and minimize transaction costs (North, 1990). 
Meyer and Nguyen (2005, p 67) argue that informal constraints are “much less transparent 
and, therefore, a source of uncertainty”. As a result, Dunning and Lundan (2008) extended OLI 
model with the institution-based location advantages which explain that institutions 
developed at home and host economies shape the geographical scope and organizational 
effectiveness of MNEs. 
The rapid growth of outward FDI from emerging and developing countries resulted in 
numerous studies trying to account for special features of emerging MNEs' behaviour that is 
not captured within mainstream theories. For example, Mathews extended OLI paradigm with 
linking, leverage, learning framework (LLL) that explains rapid international expansion of 
companies from Asia Pacific (Mathews, 2006). Here linking means partnerships or joint 
ventures that latecomers form with foreign companies in order to minimize risks involved with 
internationalization as well as to acquire “resources that are otherwise not available” 
(Mathews, 2006, p 19). Latecomers when forming links with incumbents also analyse how the 
resources can be leveraged. They look for resources that can be easily imitated, transferred 
or substituted. Finally, repeated processes of linking and leveraging allow latecomers to learn 
and conduct international operations more effectively (Mathews, 2006, p 20). 
Although emerging-market MNEs from various emerging countries differ in many respects but 
to some extent they share common characteristics. For example, Peng (2012) reports that 
Chinese MNEs are characterized by three relatively unique aspects: (1) the significant role 
played by home country governments as an institutional force, (2) the absence of significantly 
superior technological and managerial resources, and (3) the rapid adoption of (often high-
profile) acquisitions as a primary mode of entry. Kalotay and Sulstarova (2010) highlights that 
Russian MNEs’ investments are also influenced by home country policies while Barnard (2010) 
writes about the lack of strong firm capabilities among MNEs from South Africa and Taiwan. 
Gubbi et al. (2010) find that Indian MNEs are also fond of undertaking acquisitions overseas. 
Since 2002 a marked shift in corporate attitude towards global markets took place in Brazil, 
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too, but “multi-latinas“ have emerged throughout Latin America (Casanova-Kassum, 2013). 
While some emerging-market MNEs focus on neighbouring regions others target the global 
market, including the countries of the developed world. According to Gubbi and Sular (2015) 
Turkish firms seem to be using the European countries to (1) present themselves as a 
European Union company, (2) make use of special features of these countries to expand their 
businesses within and to other countries and, (3) make use of the favourable tax treatment 
policies available to foreign investors. 
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3. An East Asian model of development? 
 
3.1 The East Asian economic development 
 
The East Asian development unfolding from the 1960s, including the Japanese, Taiwanese, 
and Korean economic miracle, opened a new chapter in economic theories: the concept of 
developmental state was born, and the phenomenon that there are various ways of catching 
up, where state intervention, state support plays an important role became more and more 
accepted (see e.g. Johnson 1982; Wade 1990, Amsden 1989 or White 1988). After the Asian 
financial crisis in 1998, the popularity of the developmental state model began to decline 
(Székely-Doby 2017), but the subsequent analyses often highlighted the importance of the 
state's economic engagement in East Asian economies. Kuznets, for example, in his 1988 
article published in Economic Development and Cultural Change (Kuznets, 1988) also analyses 
the East Asian model of economic development through the example of South Korea, Japan 
and Taiwan, and highlights five common attributes of the economic successes of the three 
countries. These are: high investment rates, small public sector, competitive labour market, 
export expansion, and government intervention in the economy. 
Significant (and effective) investment in human resource development, as well as the ability 
to absorb new technology, is another common feature of these East Asian countries. Although 
high population density and scarcity of natural resources are usually a disadvantage rather 
than an economic advantage, but during the 20th century these factors have conditioned the 
three countries to act and develop further, preventing complacency or postponing the 
decisions necessary for development. 
Although Kuznets does not take the following factors into account in his article, but the above 
mentioned East Asian countries share additional, non-economic commonalities, including 
ethnic and linguistic homogeneity, relatively compact - i.e. undivided - geographical unit, 
manageable population size and Confucian traditions. In my opinion, these factors have 
certainly influenced labour productivity, propensity to save, hence contributed to the 
economic performance and development of Japan, Taiwan and Korea in the 70s and 80s (see 
Figures 1 and 2). 
 
 13 
Figure 1: Japanese, South Korean, and Chinese GDP, 1960-2016 (Billion Dollars) 
 
Source: World Bank   
According to the Maddison database, the development of the three East Asian economies 
were far from being the same during the first two millennia (Table 1.). From the 10th to the 
15th century, China was the world's leading economy in terms of per capita income, well 
ahead of Europe in terms of technological development, the use of natural resources and the 
efficiency of its administrative capacity. From the 16th century onwards, Europe has gradually 
caught up with China in terms of income, technology and science. However, in the 19th 
century and the first half of the 20th century, China's performance declined, more precisely, 
its growth rate was not as conspicuous as before, while economic development in other parts 
of the world accelerated (Maddison, 2007). With regard to per capita GDP (Table 2.), China 
has been ahead of the other two East Asian countries for a long time, but by the 19th century, 
Japan and Korea were catching up and by the end of the century they overtook China. From 
the twentieth century onwards, the difference between them continued to grow: by 1960, 
Japan's per capita GDP was six times as high, while South Korean per capita GDP was nearly 
twice as high as the Chinese. It should be noted, however, that Maddison's calculations have 
been criticized (see e.g. Holz, 2004), as they are often based on estimates and the data used 
to compile the database do not always come from data collections with a uniform 
methodology. 
 
 
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
1
9
6
0
1
9
6
2
1
9
6
4
1
9
6
6
1
9
6
8
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
2
1
9
7
4
1
9
7
6
1
9
7
8
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
8
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
4
2
0
1
6
China Japan South Korea
 14 
Table 1: GDP in Japan, South Korea and China, A.D. 1-1960 (International Dollars, million, 
1990) 
 1 1000 1500 1600 1700 1820 1870 1913 1938 1960 
Japan 1200 3188 7700 9620 15390 20739 25393 71653 176051 375090 
South Korea n.a. n.a. 3282 n.a. 5005 5637 5891 9206 24895 30395 
China 26820 27494 61800 96000 82800 228600 189740 241431 288653 441694 
Source: Maddison database (2010) 
 
Table 2: GDP per capita in Japan, South Korea and China, A.D. 1-1960 (International Dollar 
1990) 
 1 1000 1500 1600 1700 1820 1870 1913 1938 1960 
Japan 400 425 500 520 570 669 737 1387 1850 3986 
South Korea n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 600 604 869 1049 1226 
China 450 466 600 600 600 600 530 552 568 662 
Source: Maddison database (2010) 
When compared to China and Korea, Japan used to lag behind, both in terms of state-building 
and economic development, while the influence of China and Korea has remained dominant 
for centuries for the country's development. Muraközy (2016) points out that, compared to 
the countries of the Asian continent, Japan fell behind for a long time, but as a result of the 
economic successes of the first half of the Tokugava era (1603-1750) it became more 
advanced than China by the beginning of the 18th century. The real catch-up phase in Japan 
is, however, the second half of the 19th century, the time of the Meiji modernization (1868-
1912), where the centralized state management system, the continuous historical legacy and 
the effective bureaucracy supported Japan's further development. 
Korea also had historical, cultural and economic traditions originating from Chinese roots, but 
the effective bureaucracy that existed in China and Japan, as well as the spread of financial 
and commercial activities and urbanization was missing here for further development 
(Muraközy, 2016). From the end of the 19th century onwards, Japan's economic influence was 
gaining ground, that meant significant reforms for Korea, while it remained, in line with 
Japan's interests, basically an agrarian country. Thus, living standards were improving but 
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lagged far behind the Japanese level. Significant economic development in Korea, just as in 
the case of Japan, could have taken place between and after the two world wars. 
Although the Chinese economic upturn happened later, but it has been in many respects 
similar to the above and has been influenced by the development methods of the East Asian 
countries in many respects. However, there are also significant differences between them. As 
for similarities, the export-driven model as well as high investment rates were decisive in the 
first decades of Chinese development, initiated by Deng Xiaoping. In terms of both production 
for export and attracting foreign direct investment, the large and cheap labour played a 
significant role in China, too. Human resource development and the adoption, incorporation 
and development of new technologies are also typical of China. Obviously, Confucian tradition 
has had a significant impact on the organization of the Chinese state and the economy. 
However, in contrast to Japan, Korea and Taiwan, the small size of the public sector is far from 
being characteristic for China, while government intervention is significantly more prevalent 
than in the case of Japan or Korea. Similarly, China's population, population density and 
country size place the country into another dimension compared to its East Asian neighbours.  
 
Figure 2: GDP growth rate in Japan, South Korea, and China, 1961-2016 (percent) 
 
Source: World Bank   
According to Kuznets (1988), the applicability of the East Asian model depends, firstly, on 
whether a country faces similar challenges as the three countries he analysed; second, 
whether government intervention influences rather than substitutes free market mechanisms 
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and whether public opinion expects (or even demands) the government to intervene in order 
to enhance economic growth. While the first condition - facing similar challenges - is true for 
China, the second only partially characterizes it: till there is a relative social well-being, the 
society will definitely support the government. However, government intervention - especially 
in the first decades of development, under Mao, Deng and his successors - happened at the 
expense of free market mechanisms. Since the beginning of the new millennium, the gradual 
but strongly regulated expansion of free market mechanisms could have been observed in 
China, but the process was far from being merely "influential". In the past few years, however, 
slowing growth led again to the government's increased interference into the economy. 
At the time of the emergence of Japan and the first wave of newly industrialising countries in 
Asia, there were much less (internationally agreed) barriers concerning government 
intervention in the economy and mainly in its trade policy, which provided these countries 
with a much larger room for manoeuvre compared to today’s economies in their catching-up 
processes. An important example of thais difference is the case of China, where WTO 
membership came later and even after becoming a WTO member, the country does not fully 
comply with all the requirements. 
 
3.2. An East Asian Variety of Capitalism? 
 
The Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) approach, which is widely used recently in the literature, is 
an institutionalist approach, elaborated for Western developed countries (Amable, 2000). It 
tries to understand the systemic variations of developed capitalist economies’ politico-
economic institutions. As opposed to the Washington consensus and traditional neoclassical 
approaches assuming convergence among economies, it emphasizes the existence of different 
capitalist trajectories (Hall and Soskice, 2001). It distinguishes two main types of national 
political economies: Liberal Market Economies (LME) and Coordinated Market Economies 
(CME). In LME, companies coordinate their activities primary through hierarchies and 
competitive market arrangements. In CME, firms rely mainly on non-market relationships to 
organise and manage their activities. 
As explained by Sass et. al. (2018), the literature does not provide conclusive evidence 
concerning the applicability of the VoC approach to Asian economies. According to Carney at 
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el. (2009), there is no unique form of capitalism, but several forms of Asian capitalisms exist, 
which are fundamentally different from the Western types of capitalism. Witt and Redding 
(2013) present similar findings in their analysis, which among others, embraces China, Japan 
and Korea in its sample. According to their findings, only the Japanese capitalism can be 
integrated into the VoC approach. For other countries, they are fundamentally distinct from 
Western types of capitalism. As the authors state: „… the Varieties of Capitalism (VOC) 
dichotomy is not applicable to Asia; … none of the existing major frameworks capture all Asian 
types of capitalism; and … Asian business systems (except Japan) cannot be understood 
through categories identified in the West.” (Witt, Redding (2013, p. 265) However, they 
categorised the analysed 13 Asian economies into five groups according to various 
institutional variables: (post-)socialist economies, advanced city economies, emerging 
Southeast Asian economies, advanced Northeast Asian economies and Japan. They underline 
the large diversity of Asian economies along various factors, related to VoC. Furthermore, they 
emphasize important business elements, which are present in many Asian countries, but not 
in Western Europe or in North America. For example, differences in business trust, related to 
that, in forming business networks, the high levels of family control in firms, different business 
culture-values, or high level of informality. As far as our analysed countries are concerned, 
China belongs to the (post-) socialist category, Korea is an advanced Northeast Asian 
economy, while, as we saw, Japan forms a group in itself (Sass et. al. 2018). Other authors 
underline further factors influencing Asian capitalism, for example, Andriesse et al. (2011) 
propose a link between regional VoCs and global value chains in Asia. 
 
3.3 The Role of the East Asian state: the analysis of institutional and political aspects 
 
As mentioned above, the VoC literature does not provide conclusive evidence concerning the 
applicability of the VoC approach to Asian economies. Most states in the region fall either into 
the developmental state or predatory state categories (Johnson 1982, Evans 1995), with some 
of them representing hybrid cases. According to Witt and Redding (2013), China, for example, 
combines predatory elements, in which top leaders and their families use the state to enrich 
themselves. In this sense, the Chinese system is similar to the Japanese keiretsu or the Korean 
chaebol system. Based on this Witt and Redding study, only the Japanese capitalism can be 
integrated into the VoC approach, while other East Asian countries, such as China and Korea, 
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are fundamentally distinct from Western types of capitalism. In their categorization, China 
belongs to the (post-)socialist category, Korea is an advanced Northeast Asian economy, while, 
Japan forms a group in itself.  
In this section we analyse whether the Chinese political model is a special mixture of socialist 
economic concepts, or is it a hybrid solution with its own values. To answer this, we examine 
the three main elements of the system paradigm, that is (1) the political system, (2) the role 
of direct state interventions in the economy (state ownership and informal control) and (3) 
various mechanisms of economic coordination (market, bureaucratic, ethic).  
There is broad debate about China’s politico-governmental form and economy, with 
contributions from the West and from outside the People’s Republic (Mainland China), 
including some from Taiwan and from Hong Kong, which is not fully incorporated into the 
People’s Republic. According to Kornai (2016), capitalism is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for democracy, while he also adds that in China, although the transition from 
socialism to capitalism began decades ago, there is no clear sign that the country is closer to 
democracy. 
When summarizing the opinions on the politico-governmental form of China, we can 
differentiate between three approaches. According to some, China has for a long time 
possessed the main characteristics of the capitalist system, although the size of the state-
owned sector remains very great. In politico-governmental form it is clearly a dictatorship in 
all respects. As Kornai (2016, p. 571) puts it, "for a while the dictatorship softened somewhat, 
but in recent years it has hardened again...the leading political force still styles itself the 
communist party, but it abandoned long ago the Leninist program of forcing the dominance 
of state ownership and bureaucratic coordination on society". Another view is that China 
began a transition from socialism to capitalism and from dictatorship to democracy a long 
time ago, but it did so very slowly and cautiously. Therefore, this process will take a long time, 
but the final form will be more capitalist than socialist in the end. This interpretation does not 
exclude the possibility of a slow transition towards less repressive politico-governmental 
forms. Indeed, the most optimistic expectation is that the transition ends in democracy, or 
“sinocracy” that is democracy with Chinese characteristics. Finally, a third view, taken for 
example by the Chinese themselves, is that the Chinese system is a unique formation, which 
is semi-socialist and semi-capitalist at the same time. The characteristics of this formation 
 19 
differ from the standard ones of autocracy or dictatorship, therefore China can be considered 
as the main manifestation of a “third road”. The Chinese ‘zhongti xiyong’ principle - the 
coexistence of traditional Chinese elements and also solutions taken from the West (“Chinese 
things as essence and Western things as utility”) - also supports this idea.                                                     
China is paradigmatic for state control of major corporations. However, in opposition to older 
versions of state capitalism and developmental states, there is neither a classical top-down 
control nor a "single guiding enterprise model" such as the South Korean Chaebol or Japanese 
Keiretsu system. There are new forms of profit-oriented and competition-driven state-
controlled enterprises, such as China Mobile, that have emerged recently, while there are 
several private firms and public–private hybrids, too, such as Huawei, Lenovo or Geely, that 
have also been able to became successful companies on the Chinese market as well as 
globally. These days, such non-state national firms are considered as ‘national champions’ by 
state managers (Naughton, 2007; Ten Brink, 2013). With some exceptions - such as the IT 
sector, which is deeply integrated into global production networks - most industries are 
dominated by national (state-controlled, hybrid and private) capital and not by foreign 
multinationals (Nölke et. al. 2015). 
Here we can also distinguish between different views on the characteristics of Chinese state 
control. One possible opinion is Nölke et. al.'s (2015) state-permeated market economy, 
where mechanisms of loyalty and trust between members of state-business coalitions are 
based on informal personal relations. Witt and Redding (2013) consider the Chinese system 
as a system combining predatory elements with personal relations, while the Chinese 
themselves are emphasizing the advantages of the strong but effective government that 
provides internal as well as external stability. 
Regarding mechanisms of economic coordination, decision-making in most Asian states is 
usually statist. Here, again, the exception is Japan, which tends toward corporatism. China is 
characterised by a mixture of top-down statism with a strong bottom-up element. In China, 
local variations in institutions, or even informal institutions often supersede formal 
institutions, (Witt and Redding 2013). Successful institutional innovations diffuse across 
different localities and have an impact on national level institutional changes (Xu, 2011). 
Since Chinese corporate governance is a mixture of top-down and bottom-up control, it is 
characterised by multiplexity, i.e. the presence of multiple business systems: non-competitive 
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state-owned, profit-oriented and competition-driven state-controlled (such as China Mobile) 
as well as private firms (Huawei, Lenovo or Geely). Informality as well as guangxi ("net of 
relations") also plays an important role in the decision-making processes.
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4. Driving forces behind the international 
expansion strategies of Chinese MNEs 
 
Chinese outward FDI has increased in the past decades, however, in the last decade this 
process accelerated significantly. In 2012, China became the world’s third largest investor – 
up from sixth in 2011 – behind the United States and Japan with an outward FDI flow of 84 
billion US dollars and it still hold its position: the value of Chinese outward FDI grew to 183 
billion US dollars in 20164, making Chinese MNEs the largest overseas investors among 
developing countries (UNCTAD 2017). According to the estimations of Hanemann and Huotari 
(2017), the volume of investments has further increased in 2016 and has reached 200 billion 
USD, with a 40 per cent increase compared to the previous year. Several factors fuelled this 
shift, including the Chinese government’s wish for globally competitive Chinese firms or the 
possibility that outward FDI can contribute to the country’s development through investments 
in natural resources exploration or other areas (Sauvant – Chen, 2014, pp. 141-142). 
 
4.1 Comparing the roots of Chinese, Japanese and South Korean FDI5 
 
China’s rise is often compared to the post-war “Asian Miracle” of its neighbours. When we 
analyse the internationalization processes of Japanese, Korean and Chinese companies there 
are indeed several common features and similarities. Nevertheless, one of the main common 
characteristics of these three nations is the creation and support of the so-called national 
champions, i.e. domestically-based companies that have become leading competitors in the 
global market. In fact, during their developmental period, both the Japanese and Korean 
governments provided strong state financial support to their companies to protect, promote 
them as well as to strengthen them against the international competition. China has followed 
                                                     
4 China’s outward FDI net flows in 2016 reached 170.11 billion USD, according to Chinese data, that is the 
2016 Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment. 
5 This section is partly based on McCaleb A, Szunomar A (2016): Comparing Chinese, Japanese and South 
Korean FDI in Central and Eastern Europe In: Joanna Wardega (ed.) China-Central and Eastern Europe 
cross-cultural dialogue: society, business, education in transition. Kraków: Jagiellonian University Press, 
2016. pp. 199-212. 
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them later in subsidizing domestic industries and supporting their overseas activities for 
example in the form of government funding for outward FDI (Irwin and Gallagher, 2014) 
 
Figure 3. Chinese, Japanese and Korean outward FDI stock at current USD million, 1980-2017 
 
Data source: UNCTAD 
Japanese companies started to expand overseas in the early 1960s, with a modest growth at 
the beginning. The Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law and the Foreign Capital 
Law were the two main laws which regulated (and somewhat restricted) Japanese firms’ 
international activities during the 1950s-1970s. However, the revision of the Foreign Exchange 
and Foreign Trade Control Law in 1979 accelerated the overseas activities of Japanese 
companies as this revision created the opportunity for free outward investment (Yang et al, 
2009). The role of voluntary export restraints and, as a consequence, the importance of tariff-
jumping FDI were also among the various motivations of Japanese foreign direct investment. 
As a result, Japanese outward FDI stock began to increase in the late 1970s, reaching 154 
billion USD in 1989, 300 billion in 2001 and 992.9 billion USD in 2013, according to UNCTAD 
statistics (see Figure 3.). 
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Japan led the way in government-subsidized outward FDI already in the 1950s, well before the 
liberalization, through offering subsidized loans to companies investing abroad. Irwin and 
Gallagher (2014) highlight that Export-Import Bank of Japan (JEXIM) created a branch focusing 
on outward FDI already in 1953, which provided almost 70 billion USD in total by 1999 to 
finance its companies’ foreign investments. Likewise, the Japan Bank of International 
Cooperation (and its predecessor, the Japanese Development Bank) started its operation 
mainly with export loans in the 1950s but has evolved later to an outward investment creditor 
as outward FDI loans accounted for 74 percent of total loans in 2012 (Irwin-Gallagher, 2014). 
Till the end of the 1970s, Japanese outward FDI was characterized by natural resource-seeking 
motives in order to supplement the country’s resource-poor economy (Park, 2003). Between 
1979 and 1985 Japanese companies overseas investments were motivated by market-seeking, 
as – according to Yoshida (1987) – market expansion was cited as the number one reason for 
Japanese firms’ investment in the United States. Besides market-seeking investments, in the 
last twenty years, efficiency-seeking became another important motive for Japanese 
companies for cost reduction reasons (Yang et al., 2009). 
South Korean companies’ internationalization was relatively late compared to Japanese 
counterparts. Korean outward FDI policy started to evolve only in 1968 when the Act of 
Foreign Exchange Management was passed (Chan and Cui, 2014). In spite of that, outward FDI 
remained restricted till the 1980s due to the fact that Korean development was hindered with 
balance of payments problems. As a result, except for special cases – such as the access to 
natural resources or the opening of export markets – outward FDI was generally prohibited 
by the Korean government. According to Kwak (2007), for that reason, up to 1980, only 352 
cases representing outward FDI worth of 145 million USD were registered. As legal and 
economic circumstances changed in the 1980s, outward FDI began to increase significantly. 
According to UNCTAD statistics the total stock of outward FDI rose from 0.97 billion USD in 
1987 to 19.9 billion in 2001 and 219 billion USD in 2013 (see Figure 1.). 
The Korean government has also subsidized outward FDI through supporting its national 
champions, though to a smaller extent compared to Japan. By the 1990s, outward FDI lending 
grew substantially, but it still couldn’t provide sufficient momentum for Korean outward FDI 
(Irwin and -Gallagher, 2014). Korean outward FDI used to be relatively small given the size of 
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the economy, when compared to its GDP, but this situation has changed somewhat recently 
(see Figure 1.), mainly after the financial crisis. 
Traditionally outward FDI was aimed mainly at accessing natural resources or creating new 
export markets in Asia, North America and Europe, however, efficiency-seeking outward FDI 
has been growing fast, especially in Asian markets. According to a survey from 2004 cited by 
Kwak (2007, pp 29-30), investment decisions were primarily made by (labour) cost reduction 
motives, followed by market seeking concerns (34.5%), the overseas relocation of partner 
companies (9.9%), and opening up towards third markets (4.9%). 
In China, in hand with the so-called “Open Door” policy reforms, from the late 70s, the 
government encouraged investments abroad to integrate the country to the global economy, 
although the only entities allowed to invest abroad were state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The 
total investment of these first years was not significant and concentrated to the neighbouring 
countries, mainly to Hong Kong. The regulations were liberalized after 1985 and a wider range 
of enterprises – including private firms – was permitted to invest abroad. After Deng 
Xiaoping’s famous journey to the South in 1992, overseas investment increased dramatically, 
Chinese companies established overseas divisions almost all over the world, concentrated 
mainly in natural resources. Nevertheless, according to UNCTAD statistics, Chinese outward 
FDI averaged only 453 million US dollars per year between 1982 and 1989 and 2.3 billion 
between 1990 and 1999 (see Figure 3.). 
In 2000, before joining the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Chinese government 
initiated the go global or “zou chu qu” policy, which was aimed at encouraging domestic 
companies to become globally competitive. They introduced new policies to induce firms to 
engage in overseas activities in specific industries, notably in trade-related activities. In 2001 
this encouragement was integrated and formalized within the 10th five-year plan, which also 
echoed the importance of the go global policy (Buckley et al 2008). This policy shift was part 
of the continuing reform and liberalization of the Chinese economy and also reflected Chinese 
government’s desire to create internationally competitive and well-known companies and 
brands. Both the 11th and 12nd five-year plan stressed again the importance of promoting 
and expanding outward FDI, which became one of the main elements of China’s new 
development strategy. 
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Chinese outward FDI has steadily increased in the last decade (see Figure 3.), particularly after 
2008, due to the above-mentioned policy shift and the global economic and financial crisis. 
The crisis brought more overseas opportunities to Chinese companies to raise their share in 
the world economy as the number of ailing or financially distressed firms has increased. While 
outward FDI from the developed world decreased in several countries because of the recent 
global financial crisis, Chinese outward investments increased even greater: between 2007 
and 2011, outward FDI from developed countries dropped by 32 per cent, while China’s grew 
by 189 per cent (He-Wang, 2014, p. 4; UNCTAD 2013). As a consequence, according to the 
World Investment Report 2013, in the ranks of top investors, China moved up from the sixth 
to the third largest investor in 2012, after the United States and Japan – and the largest among 
developing countries – as outflows from China continued to grow, reaching a record level of 
84 billion US dollars in 2012. Thanks largely to this rapid increase of China’s outward FDI in 
recent years; China also became the most promising source of FDI when analysed FDI 
prospects by home region (UNCTAD 2013, p. 21). 
Irwin and Gallagher (2014) found that - unlike Japan or Korea - China’s market entry has more 
to do with developing project expertise and supporting exports than it does with tariff- 
hopping or outsourcing industries fading on the mainland. They identified two major reasons 
for China’s high (31%) ratio of outward FDI lending to total outward FDI: „First, China has a 
greater incentive to give outward FDI loans than Japan or Korea ever did because its borrowers 
are state- owned so it can more easily dictate how they use the money. Second, China has a 
greater capacity to give outward FDI loans because it has significantly higher savings and 
foreign exchange reserves than Japan and Korea, both today and especially during equivalent 
developmental stages” (Irwin-Gallagher, 2014, pp. 22-23) 
Although traditionally Chinese outward FDI is directed to the countries of the developing 
world, Chinese investments into the developed world, including Europe increased significantly 
in the past decade. According to the Clegg and Voss (2012), Chinese outward FDI to the 
European Union (EU) increased from 0.4 billion US dollars in 2003 to 6.3 billion US dollars in 
2009 with an annual growth rate of 57 per cent, which was far above the growth rate of 
Chinese outward FDI globally. In 2016, Chinese companies invested 35 billion EUR in the EU, 
a 77 per cent increase from the previous year (Hanemann-Huotari, 2017, p. 4). While the 
resource-rich regions remained important for Chinese companies, they started to become 
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more and more interested in acquiring European firms after the financial and economic crisis. 
The main reason for that is through these firms Chinese companies can have access to 
important technologies, successful brands and new distribution channels, while the value of 
these firms has fallen, too, due to the global financial crisis (Clegg – Voss, 2012, pp. 16-19.). 
 
4.2 Characteristics of Chinese foreign direct investment globally6 
 
As mentioned above, Chinese outward FDI flows and stock have increased after the New 
Millennium (see Figure 4. and 5. below), particularly after 2008. While more and more Chinese 
companies are investing overseas, Chinese outward FDI raises concerns and therefore causes 
strengthening protectionism against it, especially in the developed world.  
 
Figure 4. China’s outward FDI flows, million USD, 1990-2017 
 
Data source: UNCTAD 
                                                     
6 This section is partly based on a previous research of the author and the book chapter, Szunomár Á, 
Biedermann Zs: Chinese outward FDI in Europe and the Central and Eastern European region in a global 
context. In: Szunomár Á (ed.) Chinese investments and financial engagement in Visegrad countries: myth or 
reality?. 178 p. Budapest: Institute of World Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 2014. pp. 7-33. 
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Several experts believe that Chinese outward FDI could be greater if host countries were more 
hospitable. According to He and Wang (2014, p. 4-5), there are several reasons for that: 
1. state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are the dominant players in Chinese outward FDI and 
they are often viewed as a threat for market competition as they supported by the 
Chinese government; 
2. foreign companies often complain that Chinese companies may displace local 
companies from the market as they bring technology, resources and jobs away;  
3. there are fears about Chinese companies’ willingness to adapt to local environment, 
labour practices and competition. Although the above-mentioned problems indeed 
exist, they are overestimated as Chinese companies are willing to accommodate to the 
international rules of investment. 
 
Figure 5. China’s outward FDI stock, million USD, 1990-2017 
 
Data source: UNCTAD 
According to Scissors (2014, p. 5), if it is about national security, the role of Chinese ownership 
status is overblown as Chinese rule of law is weak, which means that a privately-owned 
company has to face as much pressure and constraint as its state-owned competitor. 
Nevertheless, it is worth to differentiate between SOEs, which has two types: locally 
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administered SOEs (LSOEs) and centrally administered SOEs (CSOEs). Most of the LSOEs 
operate in the manufacturing sector and they are facing competition from both private 
companies and other LSOEs, while CSOEs are smaller in number but more powerful as they 
operate in monopolised industries such as finance, energy or telecommunication (He-Wang, 
2014, p. 6). 
Although the share of private firms is growing, SOEs still account for the majority – more than 
two-thirds – of total Chinese outbound investments, however, the range of investors is 
broader, next to state-owned and private actors it includes China’s sovereign wealth fund and 
firms with mixed ownership structure. The role of SOEs seems to be declining in the past few 
years, although the government will continue to emphasize their importance as they rely on 
the revenue, job creation and provision of welfare provided by the SOEs (He-Wang, 2014, p. 
12). 
According to the go global strategy, Chinese companies should evolve into globally 
competitive firms, however, Chinese companies go abroad for varieties of reasons. The most 
frequently emphasized motivation is the need for natural resources, mainly energy and raw 
materials in order to secure China’s further development (resource-seeking motivation). 
Mutatis mutandis, they also invest to expand their market or diversify internationally (market-
seeking motivation). Nevertheless, services such as shipping and insurance are also significant 
factors for outward FDI for Chinese companies if they export large volumes overseas (Davies, 
2013, p 736). Despite China’s huge labour supply, some companies move their production to 
cheaper destinations (efficiency-seeking motivation). Recently, China’s major companies also 
looking for well-known global brands or distribution channels, management skills, while 
another important reason for investing abroad is technology acquisition (strategic asset-
seeking motivation). 
Scissors (2014, p. 4) points out that clearer property rights – compared to the domestic 
conditions – are also very attractive to Chinese investors, while Morrison (2013) highlights an 
additional factor, that is, China’s accumulation of foreign exchange reserves: instead of the 
relatively safe but low-yielding assets such as US treasury securities, Chinese government 
wants to diversify and seeks for more profitable returns. 
Regarding the entry mode of Chinese outward investments globally, greenfield FDI is 
continues to be important, but there is a trend towards more mergers and acquisition (M&A) 
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and joint venture projects overseas. Overall, greenfield investments of Chinese companies 
outpace M&As in numerical terms, however, greenfield investments are smaller in value in 
total as these include the establishment of numerous trade representative offices7. 
4.3 Chinese investments in Europe 
 
Being one of the top investors of the developing world, since 2008 Chinese investment 
increased substantially in developed economies as well. Although this increase is impressive 
by all means, according to Chinese statistics, China still accounts for less than 10 per cent of 
total FDI inflows into the EU or to the US. However, during the examination of the actual final 
destination of Chinese outward FDI, Wang (2013) found that – as a result of round-tripping 
investments – developed countries receive more Chinese investments than developing 
economies: according to his project-level data analysis, 60 per cent of Chinese outward FDI 
went to developed economies like Australia, Hong Kong, the United States, Germany, and 
Canada. 
 
Figure 6. Geographical distribution of China’s outward FDI stock, by the end of 2017 
                                                     
7 According to Chinese statistics (MOFCOM / NBS, PRC), in 2015, Chinese enterprises conduced 579 
outward M&As in 62 countries (regions), with an actual transaction amount of 54.44 billion USD. 
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Data source: MOFCOM / NBS, PRC 
As Clegg and Voss note (2012, p. 19), the industry-by-country distribution of Chinese outward 
FDI is difficult to determine from Chinese statistics. However, based on their findings, it can 
be stated that Chinese investments in mining industry are taking place mainly in institutionally 
weak and unstable countries with large amounts of natural resources and that these 
investments are normally carried out by SOEs. Investments in manufacturing usually take 
place in large markets with low factor costs, while Chinese companies seek technologies, 
brands, distribution channels and other strategic assets in institutionally developed and stable 
economies. 
In developed economies Chinese investment are less dominated by natural resource seeking 
or trade-related motives but more concerned with the wide range of objectives, including 
market-, efficiency- and strategic assets-seeking motives (Rosen and Hanemann, 2013, p. 69 
and WIR p. 46). In the case of developed countries, Chinese SOEs usually have the majority of 
deal value but non-state firms make the greater share of deals (Rosen and Hanemann, 2013, 
p. 71). In addition to greenfield investments and joint ventures, China's merger and acquisition 
(M&A) activity in developed countries has recently gained a momentum and continue an 
upward trend since more and more Chinese firms are interested in buying overseas brands to 
strengthen their own.  
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Figure 7. Chinese outward FDI stock in Europe, billion USD, 2009-2017 
 
Data source: MOFCOM / NBS, PRC 
The European Union has been the major destination for foreign direct investments in the last 
twenty years, with a dominance of intra-European FDI, extra-European FDI representing only 
about one-third of the total sum. Compared to the aggregate, Chinese foreign direct 
investment stock in the EU remains insignificant. However, regarding the trends and 
dynamism of Chinese outward FDI (see Figure 7.), the economic “footprint” and impact of 
Chinese foreign direct investment in the EU is indisputably expanding. 
Hanemann (2013) points out commercial reasons behind most investments: the acquisition of 
rich-world brands and technology to increase competitiveness, money-saving by moving 
higher value-added activities in countries where regulatory frameworks are more developed, 
or by acquiring firms cheaper due to the crisis or due to a stronger renminbi. So, the crisis only 
accelerated the long-term Chinese strategy of going global and move up the value chain 
(Parello-Plesner, 2013, p.19). 
 
Table 3. Chinese outward FDI in the EU by industry, billion USD, by 2016 
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industry stock share 
mining 238,6 27,3 
manufacturing 175,1 20,1 
financial services 144,4 16,6 
wholesale and retail 78,7 9 
leasing and business services 70,8 8,1 
subtotal 707,6 81,1 
Data source: MOFCOM / NBS, PRC 
China’s strong desire for success envisions the next phase of development building on 
innovation and high and green technology. In line with these ideas – besides mining, 
manufacturing and financial services – we’ve seen large-scale Chinese acquisitions in the 
chemicals sector – BorsodChem became part of the Wanhua Industrial Group – and the 
automotive industry – Rover Group belongs to the Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation, 
Chinese Geely Automobile Holdings owns Volvo and Chinese also have a share in what is left 
of the Swedish group Saab. Great Wall Motors Company has opened a new plant in Bulgaria 
and thus became the first Chinese automaker to assemble cars in the European Union. 
Romania has also been attracting Chinese greenfield investments, among them a plant by 
Shantuo Agricultural Machinery Equipment to produce tractors. 
 
Figure 8. Chinese FDI in selected European countries, million USD, 2017 
 33 
 
Data source: MOFCOM / NBS, PRC 
Another significant research element when taking a closer look at Chinese outward FDI in 
Europe is the geographical distribution of investments. Chinese investment is very unevenly 
distributed among EU countries. The top recipients of Chinese FDI are traditionally the United 
Kingdom, , the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Germany, Switzerland, Sweden, France, Norway 
and Italy (see Figure 8.). 
 
4.4 Push Factors for Chinese outward FDI 
 
Push factors are those factors that drive (push) investment to other countries. Several types 
of push factors contribute to the internationalization of companies from developing countries. 
We can differentiate between institutional and structural push factors. Structural push factors 
- such as gross domestic product (GDP), export-orientedness, interest rates, stock returns or 
exchange rate volatility - are related to the home country's domestic economy and market. 
Institutional push factors are related to the distance between home and host country - such 
as, for example, cultural proximity that can be measured by the size of the Chinese diaspora 
in the host country - or government policy (for country and industry recommendations), 
including specific incentives, taxes, or the role of and actors, and their interplay (Scott, 2002; 
Wang, 2002; Peng, 2005; Voss et al., 2008; Schüler- Zhou & Schüller, 2009; Luo et al., 2010.  
In China, initially, only large state-owned enterprises from the natural resource sector were 
supported to invest abroad. Later on, to help small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) 
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develop their international markets, a government regulation on capital support for SMEs was 
introduced in 2000, at the very beginning of the ‘going-global’ policy. In contrast, the 
promotion of outward FDI by privately- owned companies was only approved in February 
2006.  
Through the approval process for outward FDI projects and access to foreign exchange and 
preferential loans, the government can exert direct influence on the growth and patterns of 
outward investments. The Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China (MOFCOM) 
requested that companies invest in countries that  
1. have a close relationship with China,  
2. exhibit complementarities to the Chinese economy,  
3. are important trading partners of China,  
4. have signed investment and taxation agreements, and  
5. are part of an important economic region in the global economy (MOFCOM, 2004). 
 
The Chinese "Catalogue of Industries for Guiding Foreign Investment" 
The "Catalogue" has usually been issued by National Development and Reform Commission and the Ministry of 
Commerce. Initially, in the early 2000's, there were 67 recommended countries and seven recommended 
industries for Chinese outward FDI. The country recommendations included 26 Asian countries (three in Central 
Asia), 13 African countries, 12 European countries (ten of them in the European Union, old member states + CZ, 
HU, PL), 11 countries in North and South America, and five countries in Oceania.  
The Catalogue retains the classification of industries based on those that are encouraged, restricted, or 
prohibited. For manufacturing, the most recommended industries are usually electric machines and consumer 
electronics, while for services, trade and distribution were suggested most often. In the highly technologically 
developed EU member countries, France, Germany, the UK, and Sweden, investment in R&D was advocated as 
well. Rather surprisingly, investment in IT services was recommended in the ‘new’ EU member countries. 
4.5 Pull factors for Chinese outward FDI 
 
Host country determinants - or pull factors - are those characteristics of the host country 
markets that attract FDI towards them. Pull factors - just like push factors - can be grouped 
into institutional and structural factors. "While international and regional investment and 
trade agreements, as well as institutions such as banks or investment promotion agencies 
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(IPAs) involved in outward FDI, are counted as institutional pull factors, while structural pull 
factors include low factor costs, markets, and opportunities for asset-seeking companies" 
(Schüler-Zhou Y., Schüller M., Brod M. 2012: 163).  
In the case of emerging MNEs, the main structural/macroeconomic pull factors - i.e. host 
country determinants that can "pull" them to developed markets - are market access, low 
factor costs, qualification and/or cost of labour force, opportunities for asset-seeking 
companies, brand, know-how, knowledge, networks, distribution channels, access to global 
value chains, company-level relations and the high level of technology. Gaining access to local 
or regional markets is the driving motivation for market-seeking companies that tend to invest 
more in large economies or economies that are difficult to enter due to the host country’s 
regulations (e.g., trade barriers). Strategic asset-seeking and efficiency-seeking investors 
usually aim to acquire the newest technology, as well as marketing and management 
expertise, in highly developed host countries (Makino, Lau, & Yeh, 2002, p. 404). The high level 
of business development is another pull factor for Chinese efficiency-seeking investors, who 
try to rationalize their business processes, including production, distribution and marketing, 
by taking advantage of country differences in the cost of factor endowments or by realizing 
economies of scale and scope (Dunning, 1993). 
The most important institutional pull factors are international and regional investment and 
trade agreements, free trade agreements of the host country (or that of the EU), host 
government policies, tax incentives, residence visa, institutions such as banks, government-
related investment promotion agencies, institutional stability (intellectual property rights/IPR 
protection, product safety standards), privatization opportunities, public procurement 
processes and also Chinese diaspora. In addition to these, political relations might also play a 
role. 
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5. Chinese FDI in Central and Eastern Europe8 
 
The transformation of Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries from centrally planned 
to market economies has also generated significant research on FDI flows to these transition 
countries. However, most studies focus on the period before 2004, which is the year of 
accession of eight CEE countries into the EU (Carstensen and Toubal, 2004; Janicki and 
Wunnawa, 2004; Kawai, 2006). Investors, mainly from EU15 countries, were attracted by 
relatively low unit labour costs, market size, openness to trade and proximity (Bevan and 
Estrin, 2004; Clausing and Dorobantu, 2005; Janicki and Wunnawa, 2004). Diverse institutional 
factors influenced inward FDI but the prospects of their economic integration with the EU 
increased FDI inflows in almost all countries (Bevan and Estrin, 2004).  
When analysing the impact of the institutional characteristics of CEE countries, such as forms 
of privatisation, capital market development, state of laws and country risk, the studies show 
varying results. According to Bevan and Estrin (2004: 777) institutional aspects were not a 
significant factor in the investment decisions of foreign firms. Carstensen and Toubal (2004) 
argue that they could explain uneven distribution of FDI across CEE countries. Fabry and 
Zeghni (2010) point out that in transition countries institutional weaknesses – such as poor 
infrastructure, lack of developed subcontractor network and an unfavourable business 
environment – may explain FDI agglomeration more than positive externalities that are effects 
of linkages, such as spillovers, clusters and networks.  
Campos and Kinoshita (2008), based on a study of 19 Latin American and 25 East European 
countries in the period 1989–2004, found that structural reforms, especially financial reform 
and privatisation, had a strong impact on FDI inflows. McCaleb and Szunomar (2017) also 
found that in the case of Chinese MNEs’ motives in CEE significant role is devoted to 
institutional factors and other less-quantifiable aspects, such as political relations. 
 
                                                     
8 This section is partly based on McCaleb-Szunomár (2017): Chinese foreign direct investment in Central 
and Eastern Europe: an institutional perspective. In: Chinese investment in Europe: corporate strategies 
and labour relations. ETUI, Brussels, pp. 121-140. 
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5.1 Changing patterns of Chinese outward FDI in the CEE region 
 
The change of Central and Eastern European countries from centrally planned to market 
economy resulted in increasing flows of foreign direct investment to these transition 
countries. During the transition, the region went through radical economic changes which had 
been largely induced by foreign capital. Foreign multinationals realised significant investment 
projects in this region and established their own production networks. Investors, mainly from 
EU-15 countries, were attracted by relatively low unit labour costs, market size, openness to 
trade, and proximity.  
 
Figure 9. Chinese FDI stock in five selected CEE countries, million USD, 2003-2017 
 
      Data source: MOFCOM / NBS, PRC 
The first phase of inward Asian FDI came right after the transition: Japanese and Korean 
companies indicated their willingness of investing in Hungary already before the fall of the 
iron curtain. Their investments took place during the first years of the democratic transition. 
After the Chinese government initiated the go global policy, which was aimed at encouraging 
domestic companies to become globally competitive, Europe - including European peripheries 
- also became a target region for Chinese FDI (see Szunomár 2017).  
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As Figure 9. shows, Chinese outward investment stock in the five selected CEE countries has 
steadily increased in the last one and a half decades, particularly after 2004 and 2008, the 
accession date to the EU and the economic and financial crisis, respectively. According to 
Chinese statistics, it means a real rapid increase from 9,6 million US dollars in 2004 to 673 
million US dollars in 2010. By 2017, the amount of Chinese investments has further increased 
and reached 1009 million USD according to MOFCOM data. It is, however, also true that FDI 
flows are rather hectic (see Figure 10) and are connected to one or two big business deals per 
year. 
 
Figure 10. Chinese FDI flow to five selected CEE countries, million USD, 2007-2017 
 
Data source: MOFCOM / NBS, PRC 
Although China considers the Central and Eastern European region as a bloc (this is one of the 
reasons for creating the so-called 16+1 initiative), some countries seem to be more popular 
investment destinations than others: the selected five CEE countries host almost 55 per cent 
of total Chinese FDI stock in the 16 CEE countries (see Figure 11.). Among them, Hungary, 
Poland and Czechia have received the bulk of Chinese investment in recent years. 
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Figure 11. Chinese FDI stock in 16 CEE countries, million USD, 2017 
 
      Data source: MOFCOM / NBS, PRC 
Chinese MOFCOM' statistics are adequate to show the main trends of Chinese outward FDI 
stocks and flows, however, apart from this, it is a less reliable data source as it doesn't show 
those Chinese investments that has flowed to a country through a foreign country, company 
or subsidiary. In order to identify the country of the foreign investor that ultimately controls 
the investments in the host country, the new IMF guidelines recommend compiling inward 
investment positions according to the Ultimate Investing Country (UIC) principle. If we 
compare MOFCOM data with two other databases - the China Global Investment Tracker 
(CGIT) and OECD - that tracks back data to the ultimate parent companies (see Figure 12.), we 
find major differences in the case of the main recipients of Chinese outward FDI in CEE. 
Based on the Ultimate Investing Country principle we can also calculate the percentage share 
of Chinese outward FDI of total inward FDI in the selected five CEE countries. As CGIT statistics 
often contains various infrastructure projects - such as the planned costs of the Budapest-
Belgrade railway - that should be considered separately as those are rather credit agreements, 
we decided to use OECD data. As expected, China's share of total invested FDI in CEE is still 
negligible: it is below 1 per cent for the Czech Republic and Poland (0,7 and 0,3, respectively) 
and below 3 per cent (2,6) for Hungary. It is even less - below 0,3 per cent - in the case of 
Slovakia and Slovenia. 
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Figure 12. Comparing MOFCOM, CGIT and OECD data on China’s outward FDI stock in Czechia, 
Hungary and Poland, 2016/20179, million USD 
 
Data source: MOFCOM / NBS, PRC, CGIT, OECD 
The selected five CEE countries account for a major share of the population (around 66 million) 
and economic output (more than 1000 billion USD, according to World Bank) of Central and 
Eastern Europe and all of them have strengthened their relations with China in recent years. 
Now they have several Chinese companies investing in various sectors with a growing number 
of mergers and acquisitions in recent years, after the 2008 global crisis. Hungary still receives 
the majority of Chinese investment in the region, followed by Poland and Czechia, while 
Slovakia and Slovenia lag a little behind due to their small size and lack of efficient transport 
infrastructure. The main forms and sectors of Chinese investment are similar in all countries, 
although it is more diverse in the more popular target countries (Hungary and Poland), while 
there are certain sectors – for example, tourism– in which Chinese companies have preferred 
to target Slovenia. 
 
 
 
                                                     
9 MOFCOM and CGIT data are from 2017, while OECD data shows 2016 stock of Chinese FDI. 
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Table 4. Major characteristics of Chinese investment in five selected CEE countries 
 Hungary Poland Czechia Slovakia Slovenia 
Main form of 
investment 
Greenfield / 
brownfield, 
M&A, joint 
ventures 
Greenfield 
and M&A 
Greenfield 
and M&A 
Greenfield 
and M&A 
M&A and 
Greenfield 
Main sectors Chemical, IT / 
ICT, 
electronics, 
wholesale and 
retail, 
automotive, 
banking, 
hotels and 
catering, 
logistics, real 
estate  
IT / ICT, 
electronics, 
heavy 
machinery, 
publishing and 
printing, real 
estate, 
municipal 
waste 
processing 
Electronics, IT 
/ ICT, 
transport 
equipment, 
automotive, 
shipping, 
engineering, 
food, media, 
plate-making 
automotive 
industry, IT / 
ICT  
Chemical, 
automotive, 
airport 
construction/
airplane 
production 
industry, 
electronics/ 
high 
technology, IT 
/ ICT 
Most 
important 
Chinese 
companies 
Wanhua, 
Huawei, ZTE, 
Lenovo, 
Sevenstar 
Electronics, 
BYD 
Electronics, 
ZMJ, Comlink, 
Yanfeng, 
China-CEE 
Fund 
Liu Gong 
Machinery, 
Huawei, ZTE, 
Haoneng 
Packaging, 
Shanxi 
Yuncheng 
Plate-making 
Group, Sino 
Frontier 
Properties 
Ltd., China 
Everbright 
International 
Ltd. 
Shanxi 
Yuncheng, 
Changhong, 
SaarGummi, 
Noark, 
Huawei, ZTE, 
Shanghai 
Maling, 
COSCO, YAPP, 
CEFC, Buzuluk 
Komarov, 
China CNR 
SaarGummi, 
ZVL Auto, 
Inalfa Roof 
Systems, 
Mesnac, 
Lenovo, 
Huawei 
Zhejiang Jinke 
Culture 
Industry, 
Elaphe, Sino-
Pipistrel Asia 
Pacific, TAM 
Durabus, 
Fotona, 
Arctur, Acies 
Bio, Chiho 
Tiande Group, 
China-CEE 
Fund, Huawei 
Source: own compilation 
As presented in Table 4., Chinese investors typically target secondary and tertiary sectors of 
the selected five countries. Initially, Chinese investment has flowed mostly into manufacturing 
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(assembly), but over time services attracted more and more investment as well. For example 
in Hungary and Poland there are branches of Bank of China and Industrial and Commercial 
Bank of China as well as offices of some of the largest law offices in China, Yingke Law Firm (in 
Hungary in 2010, in Poland in 2012), Dacheng Law Offices (in Poland in 2011, in Hungary in 
2012). Main Chinese investors targeting these five countries are interested primarily in 
telecommunication, electronics, chemical industry and transportation. Although the main 
form of investment used to be greenfield in the first years after Chinese companies discovered 
the CEE region, later on - especially after the global financial crisis of 2008 - mergers and 
acquisitions became more frequent. The main reason behind this shift is that Chinese 
companies' investment are increasingly motivated by seeking of brands, new technologies or 
market niches that they can fill in on European markets. 
 
5.2 Host-country determinants of Chinese FDI in the CEE region 
 
When searching for possible pull factors that make the CEE countries a favourable investment 
destination for Chinese investors, the labour market is to be considered as one of the most 
important factors: a skilled labour force is available in sectors for which Chinese interest is 
growing, while labour costs are lower here than the EU average. However, there are 
differences within the broader Central and Eastern European region as well; unit labour costs 
are usually cheaper in Bulgaria and Romania than in the five selected CEE countries. Corporate 
taxes can also play a role in Chinese companies' decision to invest in the region. Nevertheless, 
these labour cost and tax differences within the broader Central and Eastern European region 
don’t seem to really influence Chinese investors as there is more investment from China in 
the selected CEE countries (especially in Czechia, Hungary and Poland) - where labour costs 
and taxes are relatively higher compared to Romania and Bulgaria - than in Romania or 
Bulgaria. An explanation for that can be the theory of agglomeration as generally outward FDI 
in these countries is the highest in the region (McCaleb-Szunomár 2017). 
Although the above-mentioned efficiency-seeking motives play a role, the main type of 
Chinese FDI in CEE countries is definitely market-seeking investment: by entering these 
markets Chinese companies have access not only to the whole EU market but might also be 
attracted by Free Trade Agreements between the EU and third countries such as Canada, and 
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the EU neighbouring country policies etc. as they claim that their CEECs subsidiaries are to sell 
products in the host, EU, Northern American or even global markets (Wiśniewski, 2012: 121). 
For example, Nuctech (Poland), a security scanning equipment manufacturer, sells also to 
Turkey; Liugong Machinery subsidiary in Poland targets the EU, North American and CIS 
markets, while Huawei's logistic centre in Hungary supplies 55 countries.  
Based on the interviews, Chinese companies wanted to have operations in CEE which can 
either be linked to their already existing businesses in Western Europe or can help strengthen 
their presence on the wider European market. In addition, there are also "cases of Chinese 
companies following their customers to the CEE region countries, as in the case of Victory 
Technology (supplier to Philips, LG and TPV) or Dalian Talent Poland (supplier of candles to 
IKEA)" (McCaleb-Szunomár 2017: 125). Moreover, Chinese firms’ CEE subsidiaries allow them 
to participate in public procurements. Example is Nuctech company that established its 
subsidiary in Poland in 2004 and initially targeted mainly Western European markets but 
focused later more on CEE which benefit from different EU funds. Recently Chinese firms also 
became interested in investing in food industry as a result of growing awareness about food 
safety standards and certificates. These companies would be interested in exporting 
agricultural products with EU safety certificates to China where food safety causes problems. 
These factors, however, lead us already to the institutional host-country determinants of the 
CEE region. 
We can divide institutional factors into two levels: supranational and national. Both levels are 
important elements in the location decisions of Chinese companies in the five selected CEE 
countries (McCaleb-Szunomár 2017). As for supranational institutional factors, we can state 
that the change of the institutional setting of central and eastern European countries due to 
their economic integration into the EU has been the most important driver of Chinese outward 
FDI in the region, especially in the manufacturing sector. EU membership of CEE countries 
allowed Chinese investors to avoid trade barriers and CEE countries could also serve as an 
assembly base for Chinese companies. Moreover, not only the membership but the prospect 
of their accession attracted new Chinese investors to the region: some companies made their 
first investments already in the early 2000's, before 2004. New investments arrived in the year 
of accession, too. The second phase of Chinese FDI in CEE dates back to the global economic 
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and financial crisis, when financially destressed companies all over Europe, incl. CEE, had often 
been acquired by Chinese companies. 
Another aspect of EU membership that has induced Chinese investment in the five selected 
CEE countries is institutional stability (for example the protection of property rights). It was 
important for early investors form Japan or Korea but was also one of the drivers of Chinese 
FDI due to the unstable institutional, economic and political environment of their home 
country. It is in line with the findings of Clegg and Voss (2012, p 101) who argue that Chinese 
outward FDI in the EU shows “an institutional arbitrage strategy” as “Chinese firms invest in 
localities that offer clearer, more transparent and stable institutional environments. Such 
environments, like the EU, might lack the rapid economic growth recorded in China, but they 
offer greater planning and property rights security, as well as dedicated professional services 
that can support business development”. 
National-level institutional factors includes, for example, strategic agreements, tax incentives 
and privatisation opportunities. The significance of such factors began to increase only 
recently, as majority of CEE - with the exception of Hungary - neglected relations with China 
in the early 2000's and started to focus on the potentials of this relationship only since the 
aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2008. Based on our observations as well as responses 
from interviewees, Chinese companies indeed appreciate when a business agreement is 
supported by the host country government, therefore those high-level strategic agreements 
with foreign companies investing in Hungary offered by the Hungarian government could also 
spurred Chinese investment into the region. Personal contacts were also important when 
choosing a host country in CEE.  
We also found that in the case of Chinese MNEs’ motives in CEE significant role is devoted to 
other less-quantifiable aspects: besides EU membership, market opportunities and qualified 
but cheaper labour important factors are the size and feedback of Chinese ethnic minority in 
the host country, investment incentives and subsidies, possibilities of acquiring visa and 
permanent residence permit, as well as the quality of political relations and government’s 
willingness to cooperate. 
A clear example for the above is the stock of Chinese investment in Hungary that is the highest 
in the broader Central and Eastern European region. Hungary is a country where the 
combination of traditional economic factors with institutional ones seems to play an 
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important role in attracting Chinese investors. Hungary has had historically good political 
relations and earlier than other CEE countries and intensified bilateral relations in order to 
attract Chinese FDI already from 2003 onwards. Hungary is the only country in the region that 
introduced special incentive for foreign investors from outside the EU, a 'golden visa' program, 
which is a possibility to receive a residence visa when fulfilling the requirement of a certain 
level of investment in Hungary. Moreover, Hungary has the largest Chinese diaspora in the 
region which is an acknowledged attracting factor of Chinese FDI in the extant literature, that 
is a relational asset constituting a firm’s ownership advantage (Buckley et al., 2007). Example 
is Hisense’s explanation of the decision to invest in Hungary that besides traditional economic 
factors was motivated by “good diplomatic, economic, trade and educational relations with 
China; big Chinese population; Chinese trade and commercial networks, associations already 
formed” (CIEGA, 2007). 
In addition to the above-mentioned pull factors, Hungary also seems to be committed towards 
China politically. Hungary was among the first to establish diplomatic relations with China (3rd 
October 1949), diplomatic gestures and confidence-building measures are taken from time to 
time. Hungary was the first European country to sign a memorandum of understanding with 
China on promoting the Silk Road Economic Belt and Maritime Silk Road, during Chinese 
Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit to Budapest in June, 2015. The Hungarian government was 
very keen on the Budapest-Belgrade railway project and when it signed the construction 
agreement in 2014, Prime Minister Orbán called it the most important moment in cooperation 
between the European Union and China (Keszthelyi 2014). 
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6. Summary 
 
The rise of emerging market multinationals is a new and dynamic process, while their 
approach towards their host economies are relatively unique compared to more developed 
MNEs. In this course material we summarized the existing theories of internationalization and 
foreign direct investment, presenting the mainstream theories, the Japanese School of FDI 
and some of the new theoretical avenues. After summing up the major characteristics of the 
East Asian model of development - including economic processes, institutional and political 
aspects - we analysed the major driving forces - push and pull factors - behind the international 
expansion strategies of Chinese MNEs. The analysis used a comparative approach and 
examined the similarities as well as differences of Japanese, South Korean and Chinese 
outward FDI. After presenting the main features of Chinese outward foreign direct investment 
globally, we narrowed the analysis to Chinese investments to the developed world and used 
Chinese outward FDI in Central and Eastern Europe as a case study, including its changing 
patterns, characteristics as well as major location determinants.  
As mentioned above, while Chinese outward FDI in emerging or developing countries is 
characterized more by resource-seeking motives, Chinese companies in the developed world 
are rather focusing on buying themselves into global brands or distribution channels, getting 
acquainted with local management skills and technology, so-called strategic assets. Regarding 
modes of entry, investments shifted from greenfield investments to mergers and acquisitions 
currently representing around two-thirds of all Chinese outward FDI in value. This shift is 
driven by the financial crisis, however it also seems to be a new trend of Chinese FDI to the 
developed world, while greenfield investment remains significant in the developing world. 
China’s outward FDI has also become more diversified in the past years: from mining and 
manufacturing it turned towards high technology, infrastructure and heavy industry, and 
lately to the tertiary sector: business services and finance but also health care, media and 
entertainment. Asia continues to be the largest recipient, accounting for nearly three-quarters 
of total Chinese outward FDI, followed by the EU, Australia, the US, Russia and Japan. Numbers 
might be misleading though due to round-tripping (the investment is placed in offshore 
financial centres only to flow it back in the form of inward FDI to China to benefit from fiscal 
incentives designed for foreign investors). According to project-level analysis, 60 percent of 
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Chinese outward FDI is aimed at developed economies like Australia, Hong Kong, the United 
States, Germany, and Canada. 
As for Chinese outward FDI to the European Union, the Eurozone crisis attracted Chinese 
investors due to falling prices. As mentioned, Chinese investors prefer „old European“ 
investment destinations not only because of market size but also because of well-established, 
sound economic relations with these countries. 
Chinese investment in CEE constitutes a relatively small share in China’s total FDI in Europe 
and is quite a new phenomenon. Nevertheless, Chinese FDI in the region is on the rise and 
may increase further due to recent political developments between China and certain 
countries of the region, especially Hungary, Czechia and - to a lesser extent - Poland. The 
investigation of the motivations of Chinese outward FDI in CEE shows that Chinese MNEs 
mostly search for markets. CEE countries’ EU membership allows them to treat the region as 
a ‘back door’ to the affluent EU markets and Chinese investors are attracted by the relatively 
low labour costs, skilled workforce, and market potential. It is characteristic that their 
investment pattern in terms of country location resembles that of the world total FDI in the 
region. 
However, macroeconomic or structural factors do not fully explain the decisions behind 
Chinese FDI in the broader Central and Eastern European region. Hungary, the largest 
recipient of Chinese investment, is not the most attractive location in terms of either cutting 
costs or the search for potential markets. This indicates that institutions may be crucial when 
choosing location for Chinese companies. 
Country-level institutional factors that impact location choice within CEE countries seem to be 
the size of Chinese ethnic population, investment incentives such as special economic zones, 
'golden visas' or resident permits in exchange for given amount of investment, privatization 
opportunities, but also good political relations between host country and China. 
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Annex 
 
Course syllabus 
 
Academic Year: 2018/2019 Spring Semester  
Course Type: Far-East and China Area Studies Modul course, CUB International Relations 
Multidisciplinary Doctoral School  
Instructor: Ágnes Szunomár, Ph.D., Research Fellow, Head of Research Group on Development 
Economics at the Institute of World Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies of 
the Hungarian Academy of Sciences  
E-mail: szunomar.agnes@krtk.mta.hu  
Course Overview: Outward foreign direct investment (outward FDI) from Asian emerging 
regions is not a new phenomenon, what is new, is the magnitude that this phenomenon has 
achieved over the past two decades. The recent takeovers of high-profile companies in 
developed or developing countries by Asian emerging-market multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) as well as the greenfield or brownfield investments of emerging companies show a 
new trend where new kind of firms become major players globally. This discussion-based 
course focuses on the rise of multinational enterprises (MNEs) from Asian emerging markets. 
Topics include the main theories of internationalization, the global patterns and recent trends 
of Chinese as well as other Asian MNEs, push and pull factors behind the international 
expansion strategy of Asian MNEs, together with company case studies focusing on human 
resource and other management issues. 
Course Requirements: Students are expected to complete all the required readings (specified 
during the course) before every class, and to contribute actively to the discussions. For every 
reading, there will be a discussion leader, who does a short, ten/fifteen-minute opening 
presentation, to get the discussion started, while two other students will act as discussants. 
The main output of the course will be a seminar paper of about 20 pages. The topic of the 
paper (which must be related to the topic of the course) has to be submitted by session 4, 
including a few bibliographic suggestions, while the outline of the paper, including a tentative 
bibliography, by session 6. The final paper will be due three weeks after the last session. 
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Grading: Final paper: 40%, Presentations: 30%, Participation: 30%. The grades are as follows: 
0-50%: Fail (1); 51-62%: Pass (2); 63-74%: Satisfactory (3); 75-86%: Good (4); 87-100%: 
Excellent (5).  
Class participation is compulsory; students may miss a maximum of 25% of the classes (3 
classes). Students, however, are encouraged to discuss any absence planned or unexpected 
with the instructor. 
 
Session One - Introduction. Outline of the Course. Review of Requirements and Readings 
Session Two -  How do emerging market firms internationalize? - Old versus new theories.  
Session Three - Chinese MNEs activities globally 
Session Four - Chinese MNEs in Europe 
Session Seven and Eight - Driving forces and location choices behind the international 
expansion strategy of Asian MNEs: Push and pull factors  
Session Nine, Ten, Eleven - Company cases – Investment motivations, management and 
human resource management methods, social responsibility, etc. Suggested company cases: 
Suzuki, Samsung, Huawei and ZTE, Hankook, Tata, LG, Wanhua, Midea/KUKA, etc. 
Session Twelve - Summary and consultations on the final course papers 
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Outward FDI stock in selected Asian economies 
 
in US Dollars at current prices in millions 
data source: UNCTAD Statistics) 
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Hong Kong SAR China outward FDI stock 
 
 
Taiwanese outward FDI stock 
 
 
South Korean outward FDI stock 
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Singaporean outward FDI stock 
 
Indian outward FDI stock 
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